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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER

22 December 1981 Information as of 1600 \*

## SITUATION REPORT: POLAND

The regime continues to project an image of returning to "normalcy." The first announced meeting of the politburo took place today, and the military presence in Warsaw appears to have been reduced. The curfew in the Gdansk region has been shortened, and newspapers currently not being published apparently will reappear next Monday. According to a government spokesman, some internees have been released, with others to follow depending on how pacification proceeds. These all appear to be cultural figures, not Solidarity activists who might return to the factories in order to organize resistance.

At the same time the Polish party's Central Committee is reporting a decline in strike activity, it notes that Solidarity has absorbed the initial shock of martial law and is now attempting to rebuild its structure. Union militants are reported to be active in Warsaw and several provinces and Solidarity banners are reappearing in some factories.

The regime's press spokesman, who reiterated that Solidarity was only suspended, also claims that Walesa is conducting talks with representatives of the government. Although there is no other information to confirm this, Walesa apparently has been moved to Warsaw, perhaps to facilitate preliminary exchanges with the Church and the authorities. Until now Walesa has been adamant about not negotiating until the union's senior officials are freed. As recently as yesterday, Archbishop Glemp told the US Ambassador that Walesa was resisting talks.

The government still faces some trouble spots. Three facilities in Katowice remain on strike--two mines where nearly 3,000 workers are still on strike and Huta Katowice where the Central Committee admitted today around 1,000 are on strike. A US embassy officer, observing the steel plant, noted that only

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The Soviet ambassador to Mauritius,	25X1
told a leftist contact that Lech	<del>2</del> 5 <b>X</b> 1
Walesa was a "good socialist" who would make the decisions necessary for the good of his country. The remark of the	
Ambassador, who was presumably speaking in accord with official guidance, suggests that, at least on 17 December, the Soviets	
regarded Walesa as a potentially useful tool who could be	
employed to reshape Solidarity along the submissive lines of "official" Soviet unions. This Soviet assessment may have been	
shaken in the interim by Walesa's intractability. Nevertheless,	
the ambassador's remarks suggest that Moscow is encouraging the Poles to search for malleable figures among the arrested leaders	
of Solidarity.	25 <b>X</b> 1
In a move apparently connected with the imposition of	
martial law, the entire KGB department dealing with Poland was placed on alert and that	25X1
officers had to be on call during off hours. The alert status presumably remains in effect. He also claimed that there was a	
"colossal" number of KGB personnel in Poland, including many	
"illegals" who worked under foreign cover to infiltrate Solidarity. Such an extensive network of informants and	
operatives might give Moscow a clearer picture of the situation	
on the ground in <u>Poland and stre</u> ngthen its ability in dealing with the regime.	25X1
Eastern European Reaction	
The media in the Warsaw pact states continue to stress a "gradual return to normalcy in Poland," but private reactions	
within the moderate Hungarian leadership are more pessimistic. The independent Yugoslavs are openly more critical of the Polish	
regime.	25 <b>X</b> 1
An official Hungarian assessment of 18 December stressed	
that Jaruzelski's gamble may not work without some cooperation from Solidarity and that serious shortages could lead to a	
"popular uprising." The report, which preceded Kadar's visit to	
Moscow last weekend, suggested that the Soviets were not entirely	

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pleased that the military, rather than the party, was taking charge. Hungarians speculated, however, that Soviet leaders would accept "Polish army ascendancy" at least for the present rather than intervene.	25 <b>X</b> 1
expressed concern to us that intervention may be the only alternative in the long term. He said that Hungary is sympathetic to the Poles' plight and willing to send food. Budapest announced for the first time on 21 December that it had joined other socialist countries in sending food to Poland.	25X1 25X1
In Yugoslavia, there has been a steady erosion of the initial tone of guarded understanding for the Polish military's seizure of power. On 18 December, Stane Dolanc, an influential member of the party leadership, decried the Polish military takeover as a precedent that "could have grave consequences for Poland, the international workers movement and international relations in general." Since Warsaw admitted that there had been bloodshed, the Yugoslav media has been even more pessimistic, focusing on the lack of a "political dialogue" in Poland and the failure of the Polish Party to meet the Polish workers' appeals for "socialist renewal."	. 25 <b>X</b> 1

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